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AIRLINE DEREGULATION-A HOAX?
JAMES W. CALLISON*
THE STATED goals of the airline deregulators1 are ostensibly
laudatory: More competition, lower fares and rates, more
service, greater management freedom, speedier regulation and, in
general, less regulation-goals, indeed, which are not unlike moth-
erhood, apple pie, and patriotism. It is not the purpose of this es-
say to quarrel with the goals.
Its purpose rather is to show that the proposed means are whol-
ly unnecessary to the coveted ends-that the proposed legislative
surgery, indeed, can more logically be related either (1) to the
fact that its support is cresting in an election year or (2) to pique
by those now urging deregulation over past, considered declination
by an independent federal agency (the Civil Aeronautics Board)
to follow their wishes in resolving various economic/regulatory
issues-or, more likely, both-than it can be to any real need for
legislative change. Most of the stated goals of the deregulators are
* Vice President-Law & Regulatory Affairs, Delta Air Lines, Inc.
'The original efforts to revamp the existing air transport regulatory statutes
were openly described as "deregulation" efforts. The basic concept was perhaps
most candidly described in the following quotation, which has been attributed to
the former head of the White House Task Force on revision of regulatory statutes:
Let anybody set up an airline and fly anyplace they g---d- please
and charge what they want. If a few airlines go under in the process,
that is not the government's problem.
DUN'S REVIEW, Sept. 1975, at _.
Needless to say, this revealing description of the goals of the deregulators soon
proved to be unpopular. Accordingly, those seeking extensive alteration of the
present system have switched their banner to that of "regulatory reform." But
the basic goal remains essentially the same, a system governed by pure textbook
laissez faire economics, with little regard for the fact that common carrier trans-
portation is in many respects imbued with public trust and public utility char-
acteristics. As such, competition and the profit motive, while both important,
must be balanced with public service factors affecting each area of the nation,
their interrelationship, and their impact on national growth and development, if
the overall public interest is to be determined and fulfilled.
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already provided for in the existing statute and, indeed, have large-
ly been accomplished.
As these thoughts are developed, a more fundamental and trou-
blesome question should be borne in mind: If, as even the dereg-
ulators admit, this country has the greatest air transportation sys-
tem in the world, with more service in more markets by more, car-
riers with greater variety and at lower fares than exist elslewhere--
and if all of this is provided in constantly increasing volume even
as per-seat and per-plane mile fuel consumption, and adverse en-
vironmental (noise and emission) impact, both steadily decrease
-why the sudden desire to tinker with the regulatory system un-
der which the United States, in these respects, has become the en-
vy of the rest of the planet? The small town chamber of commerce,
the traveling businessman, the thoughtful politician now able to di-
vide his time between Washington and home constituency, indeed
all present users of air transportation and any careful student of the
law or economics will want to ponder this question most carefully
lest he stand by while our nation's leadership in air transportation
and in aircraft development and manufacturing,' is lost to experi-
mentation and other, perhaps less worthy goals.
2 The United States may very well already be in the process of losing, to the
U.S.S.R. and Western European countries, some of the leadership which this
country has enjoyed in aero research and commercial aircraft development since
World War 11. If this be so, one of many important causes was the excessive
concern over unproven allegations of possible atmospheric damage and/or undue
over-ocean noise from supersonic operation that persuaded Congress to withdraw
funding of commercial supersonic aircraft development. The magnitude of this
research would have been such that the nation would have benefited from it
immensely even if a commercial supersonic aircraft had never flown. But such
an aircraft would have flown, of course, because the same research would have
overcome or proven groundless the various objections raised. The magnitude of
the research was also such that it could only have been funded by the public
as a whole-a funding that could soon have been repaid in national technological
achievements and, if an opportunity had been afforded to use the fruits of the
research, by direct repayments. The price of quitting the field may not only be
loss of supremacy in these fields to nations other than the United States. Severe
damage may thereby have been done to our balance of payments program (com-
mercial aircraft have been our largest export product for years and clearly remain
the largest technological export). In addition, the mutually beneficial exchange
of research between military and commercial aircraft development (with the
military often taking the lead in technological advances but with commercial
aircraft development producing the economic viability and long term depend-
ability desired by both sets of users), may also have been seriously damaged. If
the deregulators were now also to succeed in dismantling the nation's air trans-
portation system, as many justifiably feel their proposals would do, the damage
to the national interests would be multifold.
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Nothing in this article should be construed as suggesting that
periodic review of the nation's aviation statutes (or any other law,
for that matter) is not desirable. Even good laws-and this article
will show that the Federal Aviation Act3 is an outstanding example
of a "good law"-can be improved, as can the implementation and
execution of those laws. The current review of the aviation statutes
and airline regulation, therefore, has been welcomed by the U.S.
air transport industry. But the question remains whether something
as drastic as the deregulators propose is either necessary or desir-
able, or whether their suggestions are excessive to their alleged ob-
jectives.
The answer, which this article will undertake to develop, is that
the bulk of the deregulators' goals are already provided for in the
existing statute, and, indeed have largely been accomplished. This
will be developed by examining the more prominent of the stated
goals of the deregulators from two standpoints: The extent to which
present law already provides for their accomplishment and, if it
does, whether there is justification for a charge that the goals have
not been achieved and will not be achieved in the absence of major
legislative change.
I. INDUSTRY COMPETITION; FREEDOM OF ENTRY AND EXIT
The deregulators charge that competition is restrained under
existing circumstances "by severely restricting the entry of new firms
into the industry and tightly controlling which cities existing air-
lines are allowed to serve." Neither the provisions of the present
statute nor the history of the Civil Aeronautics Board's (the CAB)
application thereof support this charge.
A. The Law
The existing statute strongly favors competition within the air
transport business. Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act5 sets
3 Originally passed as the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat.
973 et seq. (1938), and, after study, reenacted in virtually the same form with
respect to economic regulation as the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301 et seq. (1970).
4 Quoted from page 2 of the so-called "Fact Sheet" which was issued when
the Administration's proposed Aviation Act of 1975 was released. [hereinafter
cited as ADMINISTRATION'S FACT SHEET].
649 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
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forth six factors by which the CAB is to be guided "in the exer-
cise and performance of its powers and duties" and which it is to
consider "as being in the public interest and in accordance with the
public convenience and necessity." One of these factors' is "com-
petition to the extent necessary" to assure the sound development
of an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense. This is one of those remark-
ably flexible provisions which continually looks to the future as
times and circumstances change.
This provision permeates many others in the statute which rein-
force its competitive goals. For example, the licensing section first
invites applications for certificates, including applications for the
right to compete against already established lines.' This section then
states that the CAB "shall" issue the requested certificate, in whole
or in part, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing and able to per-
form the proposed transportation "and that such transportation is
required by the public convenience and necessity." Because of sec-
tion 102, the latter standard contemplates "competition to the ex-
tent necessary" to insure adequate service and, as will be discussed
649 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) reads as follows:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this
Act, the Board shall consider the following, among other things,
as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest
degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such
transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate
transportation by air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competi-
tive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics.
749 U.S.C. 5 1371(b) (1970).
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later in this article, the section has been applied so as to create a
highly competitive system, with two, three, four and even five car-
tiers certificated to serve a number of domestic markets.
Full ability for the certificated carriers to compete in accordance
with their own notions of what will best accomplish the statutory
goal of reasonable competition and best serve the public, is guaran-
teed by section 401 (e) (4),' 49 U.S.C. 371 (c) (4) which pro-
hibits the CAB from imposing any "term, condition or limitation"
on a certificate which would
restrict the right of an air carrier to add to or change schedules,
equipment, accommodations, and facilities for performing the auth-
orized transportation and service as the development of the busi-
ness and the demands of the public shall require.'
Similarly, once certificated, service can be temporarily suspended
or can permanently be abandoned only after opportunity has been
given to affected travelers and shippers to protest, and where the
cessation is found to be in accord with the public interest and the
public convenience and necessity.'" In cases where competitive serv-
ice is involved, this would entail a finding that the competition is no
longer necessary to accomplish the broad national interest goals
which section 102 states are part of the public convenience and
necessity.
The present statute does not provide for unfettered competition.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit recently observed:
[T]his was one of an emerging group of statutes that did not regulate
the so-called "natural monopolies" that identified conventional pub-
lic utility regulation, but instead called for "regulated competition,"
achieving the benefits of competition without the evils of unre-
strained entry or under-cost rate wars."
But this does not detract from the favor with which the statute
views competition in the air transport industry. As the court further
observed in Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board:
849 U.S.C. S 1371(e)(4) (1970).
9 Id.
1049 U.S.C. §§ 1371(g), (j) (1970) (suspension and abandonment respec-
tively).
"1 Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 519 F.2d 944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
1975]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
It is significant that Congress, addressing itself to the air trans-
port industry, deliberately fashioned this 1938 law so as to identify
competition in express language as a key element of the public in-
terest. During the Senate debate it was emphasized that both of the
1938 bills-the McCarran bill and the Administration substitute-
altered the general declaration of policy contained in earlier bills to
take "explicit recognition of the importance of competition to the
extent necessary to assure the sound development of air transport."1
The Civil Aeronautics Board has clearly taken note of the signifi-
cance of this legislative drafting change. In an early decision
(1940, just two years after its creation), the Board read the inclu-
sion of the express reference to competition in what is now section
102 of the Federal Aviation Act " to render inapplicable the doc-
trine developed under other transportation regulatory schemes, to
the effect that competition should not be authorized where an exist-
ing carrier is furnishing adequate service and stands ready to meet
any additional service needs of the public." Just three years later
the Board further interpreted the unique, pro-competition features
of its organic statute as creating a clear presumption in favor of
competition:
While no convenient formula of general applicability may be avail-
able as a substitute for the Board's discretionary judgment it would
seem to be a sound principle that, since competition in itself pre-
sents an incentive to improve service and technological develop-
ment, there would be a strong, although not conclusive, presump-
tion in favor of competition on any route which offered sufficient
traffic to support competing services without unreasonable increase
of total operating costs (emphasis added).1
The agency explained during these same early years, as it has many
times since, that it is directed to implement competition where the
service will not be destructive or uneconomical, because competi-
tion generally promotes the other public interest factors set forth
in the statute's policy declaration:
The greatest gain from competition... is the stimulus to devise and
12Id.
13 A provision which had no counterpart in other transportation statutes such
as the Motor Carrier Act, which provided early precedent for the CAB in many
other areas.
14 American Export Airlines, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 16, 29-31 (1940).
11 Additional North-South California Services Case, 4 C.A.B. 373, 375 (1943).
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experiment with new operating techniques and new equipment, to
develop new means of acquiring and promoting business, including
the rendering of better service to the customer and to the Nation....
Competition invites comparison as to equipment, costs, personnel,
methods of operation, solicitation of traffic, all of which tend to as-
sure the development of an air transportation system as contem-
plated by the Act.1"
This basic philosophy, recognizing and applying the pro-compe-
tition provisions of the present statute, has been emphasized and
expanded during every decade since these initial rulings, as the
CAB has steadily made the U.S. air transport system more and
more competitive. As early as 1951, in a decade that was to see a
great proliferation of competitive routes'--often certificated, con-
trary to the implications of the deregulators, for the specific pur-
pose of fostering low fare air transportation, i.e., price competi-
tion in general ' 8-the Board simultaneously described the fact that
it already had a history of strongly favoring competition, and the
agency's determination to continue pursuing this course:
This is not the first instance where we have heard the argument
that regulated monopoly is preferable to competition, or the first in-
stance where we have been asked to reexamine our decision finding
that a competitive service is in the public interest. We are well
aware of the arguments pointing out that theoretically a benevolent
monopoly could provide service more economically. Yet the history
of this country and the decisions of its courts furnish numerous
examples of the evils of monopoly, which indicate that monopolies
do not long remain benevolent, but become inefficient, and that
their own profits and exercise of prerogatives are placed ahead of
the public interest. The Board has from the outset consistently
taken the position that the Act implies the desirability of compe-
tition in the air transportation industry, where it will be neither
destructive nor uneconomic. The Board has repeatedly recognized
the benefits of competition, and the inability of economic regula-
1 Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83, 103-04 (1946). See also, e.g., Domestic Pas-
senger Fare Investigation, CAB Order No. 71-4-54, at 27 (April 19, 1971); Sea-
board & Western Airlines, Inc., Mail Authorization, 29 C.A.B. 49, 85 (1959);
Southern Service to the West Case, Reopened, 18 C.A.B. 790, 799-800 (1954);
Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 12 C.A.B. 900, 901 (1951); IATA Agency Resolu-
tions Proceeding, 12 C.A.B. 493, 509 (1951); Colonial Airlines, Inc., Atlantic
Seaboard Operation, 4 C.A.B. 552, 555 (1944).
17 See note 71 infra.
"
8 See, e.g., Denver Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 1178, 1183 (1955); New York-
Chicago Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 973, 978 (1955).
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tion alone to take the place of the stimulus which competition pro-
vides in advancement of technique and service in air transporta-
tion. Colonial Air, et al., Atlantic Seaboard Op., 4 C.A.B. 552
(1944); Transcontinetnal & W. A., North-South California, 4
C.A.B. 254, 373 (1943); Northeast Air, et al., Boston Service, 4
C.A.B. 686 (1944); West Coast Case, 8 C.A.B. 14, 19 (1947).
There is no regulation which would assure courtesy by a carrier's
employees, and it would be difficult to dictate many other matters
affecting the quality of the service rendered. In each instance where
additional service was authorized the existing carriers argued that
competitive service was not required. In each instance the existing
carrier showed that its service was adequate to carry the volume
of traffic, that it could secure additional equipment in such quan-
tities as was needed to operate any number of schedules. There
was no claim that the Post Office Department utilized the full
capacity of service and needed the additional service to fill the
needs of the postal service. In addition to the existing air service,
there were also fine rail and highway services available between
the cities involved. Yet in each instance this Board found that ad-
ditional air service was required by the public interest, and in
some instances authorized not one, but two additional carriers to
operate between the points involved. These instances did not in-
volve route characteristics so unique as to limit consideration of
the principles and benefits of competition to these particular
cases.' 9
As the quotation indicates, by the 1950's it was firmly established
that, in considering the extent to which competition is necessary to
the sound development of the air transportation system, the Board
"has not been guided by the negative concept of determining first
whether the existing services met minimum standards of legal ade-
qu acy .
' '
92
This cardinal principle was expressed even more expansively in
the last half of the 1960's, when still another major layer of com-
petition was established in all areas of the nation.2 ' By this time,
neither the present nor potential adequacy of service by incum-
"Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 12 C.A.B. 900, 901-02 (1951). The Board also
recognized the other public interest factors contained in Section 102 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act by stating that the touchstone is not "competition for compe-
tition's sake" but rather the "overall public interest," which can be determined
only after consideration of all the facts and circumstances of each individual
case, in light of all the Congressionally prescribed standards. Id. at 902.
20Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52, 60 (1955).
21 See note 71 infra.
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bents, the imminent introduction of large new aircraft types such as
the Boeing 747, declining carrier earnings, nor even the fact that
past service deficiencies could be attributed to delivery delays by
aircraft manufacturers, could overcome the strong presumption in
favor of competition. This was made clear in the Board's decision
in Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation when, among
other things, the Board said:
The Federal Aviation Act and the Board's regulation under that
statute look to the establishment of an air transportation system
characterized by competition to the extent feasible. The inherent
premise is the desirability of competition and the reliance upon the
forces of competition to assure high levels of service and efficiency
and low prices for the public. It may be necessary to repeat this
concept from time to time but it is so engrained in the regulatory
scheme that its justification at this late date would be redundant."2
And in the current decade we once more see the CAB stressing
that, although inadequacy of existing service is a factor to be weigh-
ed heavily in assessing the need for a competitive spur, the presence
of adequate service by a monopoly carrier does not supplant the
statutory emphasis on competition.' Only recently the CAB has
certificated additional competition" and has instituted a new round
of cases's similar to those in the 1940's, the mid-1950's and the
22 Pages 11-12 of the Initial Decision in Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop
Investigation, adopted as the Board's own opinion by CAB Order No. 69-7-135,
at 7 (July 24, 1969). It might be noted that this case established head-to-head,
nonstop competition in markets where the first single-carrier service had been
possible only eight years earlier. Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33
C.A.B. 701 (1961).
" See, e.g., Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, CAB Order No. 71-4-54,
at 27 (April 9, 1971) where the Board states:
One of our principal policies has been that the traveling public is
entitled to the benefits of competition whenever it is justified by ex-
isting and projected market traffic. We have stated that major mar-
kets require competition regardless of the quality or quantity of
service provided by monopoly carriers.
This continues to reflect the early interpretations, for example in the Syracuse-
New York City Case, 24 C.A.B. 770, 790 (1947), where the CAB stated:
[als to the principal criteria for authorizing competing service: the
size, importance, and potential are the prevailing factors, not ade-
quacy of service.
24Reopened Service to Omaha and Des Moines Case, CAB Order No. 75-9-19
(Sept. 8, 1975); CAB Order No. 75-12-34 (Dec. 5, 1975).
' See, e.g., in domestic markets, Midwest-Atlanta Competitive Service Case,
CAB Docket No. 28115 (filed July 28, 1975); Boston-Atlanta Nonstop Service
Investigation, CAB Docket No. 28033 (filed June 30, 1975); Detroit-Boston Non-
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last half of the 1960's to consider the authorization of still more
new and competitive routes.
As the court in Continental summarized the existing statutory
mandate for competition, and the CAB's interpretation and appli-
cation thereof:
The legislative history and the early CAB decisions indicate
that there is no presumption in favor of competition per se because
competition may prove uneconomical and destructive of the heal-
thy development of the industry if the relevant market is too small
to support competing carriers. But when sufficient traffic exists to
support competition, certification of competing carriers is man-
dated by the Act as providing the best means of effectuating the
other public interest goals contained in § 102 (emphasis added) .
In Continental, the court of appeals further refined the doctrine
by stressing that this mandate is to be applied on an individual mar-
ket-by-market basis, and cannot be avoided by reference to gen-
eral industry economic conditions:
The only remaining factor mentioned in the CAB's prior deci-
sion in this matter was the financial condition of the industry as a
whole. But that consideration had been relied upon solely in terms
of justifying a "more than usually careful" approach to evaluating
the competition question in the San Diego-Denver market. That
approach may have validity, if not carried to extremes, for it still
leads up to an ultimate decision focused on the subject market.
But we are unable to discern on what basis the Board can glean
any support from this factor of general conditions once it has rec-
ognized, as it now apparently has, that the particular market will
sustain competition and still be profitable. If an air transport mar-
ket is substantial and thriving, we do not see how the fact that
other markets are over-served, can justify leaving this market
under-served, or depriving it of the public-interest benefits of com-
petition (emphasis added). 2
Under existing law, U.S. air transportation is provided by pri-
vately owned companies, and is guided, on the one hand, by the
stop Route Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 27758 (filed April 18, 1975); Shreve-
port-Dallas Nonstop Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 27330 (filed Dec. 27, 1974);
Miami-Los Angeles Competitive Nonstop Service Case, CAB Docket No. 24694
(filed Aug. 23, 1972); Oklahoma/Denver-Southeast Points Investigation, CAB
Docket No. 20421 (filed Oct. 30, 1968). There are also a number of international
cases pending in which creation of competition is contemplated.
2519 F.2d at 960.
27 Id.
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profit motive which is at the heart of the competitive enterprise
system and, on the other hand (because of its quasi-utility nature),
by this system of "regulation with common sense" which so heavily
favors competition. Under such a system, with its strong rebuttable
presumption in favor of competition and with the enthusiastic re-
sponse which the public has given the scheduled and charter air
transportation of persons and property, it has to be assumed that
any opportunity to compete in the business at a profit will be sought
by one or more companies. As shown in subsequent portions of this
article, this in fact has been the case.
It must further be presumed that if the law and its presumption
in favor of competition are not made available or are not applied
to the reasonable satisfaction of the applicant, resort will be had to
the federal courts. This is as true at the outset of certification pro-
cedures as it is at the end thereof. Thus, for example, cases such as
Delta Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board8 and Civil Aeronautics
Board v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." clearly establish the right of appli-
cants to a fair hearing on their applications for new and competitive
authority, or before existing authority is withdrawn or modified."
The recent Continental" case lines the courts up squarely behind
applicants for competitive authority if, despite a hearing, these ap-
plicants think that the right to compete has been improperly with-
held or confined. In Continental, after rejecting the Board's rea-
sons for believing that the presumption in favor of competition had
been overcome with respect to applications for competitive nonstop
authority in the San Diego-Denver market, the court ordered the
28 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 275
F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
29367 U.S. 316 (1961).
,0 The first of these cases, and the second cited in footnote 28, are two of
many by the federal courts interpreting the so-called "Ashbacker Doctrine," which
requires a comparative hearing and consideration by an agency of two mutually
exclusive applications, and thus giving competing applicants for new or competi-
tive authority an equal chance to be selected as the authorized carrier in situations
where the economics will not support both carriers. The second case mentioned
in the text, involving an award of competitive authority, prevented the CAB from
using assumed reconsideration powers not specifically granted in the statute to
withdraw an earlier certificate grant which had become effective and had been
implemented. The agency was specifically directed to utilize what is now Section
401(g), requiring notice and a hearing and therefore opportunity for the affected
carrier and the traveling and shipping public to express views and present evi-
dence concerning the subject before the authority is modified.
31 519 F.2d at 960.
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Board to proceed with dispatch to a resolution of the case, which
had been pending for some years.
In summary, there seems little room to improve either the policy
or the letter of the existing statute-it clearly stands strongly in fa-
vor of competition in the U.S. air transport industry.
B. The, Facts
But what about the CAB's record under that law? Has it stifled
competition and prevented entry into the business despite the statu-
tory provisions? Assuming arguendo this to be the legitimate in-
quiry" it will briefly be explored because, here too, the arguments
of the deregulators are contrary to fact.
The arguments are that the CAB has "severely restricted" the
entry of new firms and "tightly controlled" which cities existing air-
lines are allowed to serve.' The facts are as follows.
(1) There Has Been Extensive Entry Into The Air Transport Busi-
ness.
During the first full year of the CAB's existence (1939) there
were 16 carriers operating under its authority.' The largest flew
19,170,018 plane miles, and generated 207,360,215 revenue pas-
senger miles. The figures for the smallest were 714,978 plane miles
and 2,143,245 revenue passenger miles."
What has happened since 1939? Most fundamentally, eighty-six
new companies have been certificated to enter the U.S. air trans-
port business (some have since ceased to exist, mostly through mer-
ger with other carriers after being unable to produce sustained prof-
its on their own)," and hundreds more operate under CAB-granted
exemption from the certificate requirements.' Four whole new
32 If the law is good and sufficiently flexible to meet changing times, as it is,
legislative supervision and judicial review seem a much prefereable course for
resolving objections than forcing change by means of unproven legislative change.
31 ADMINISTRATION'S FACT SHEET, at 2.
3 4 DRAFr REPORT OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
AIRLINE REGULATION BY THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (1975).
1 The figures given are for National Airlines. Colonial Airlines flew fewer
plane-miles (374,581) but generated more revenue passenger-miles (3,079,143).
CAB ANNUAL AIRLINE STATISTICS (1938-1942).
s' The total of 86 includes U.S. company entrants into domestic, territorial
and international operations in both scheduled and supplemental service.
" The latter action is another example of the remarkable flexibility of the
present Federal Aviation Act and its ability to adapt to changing times and cir-
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"industries" have been created-the all-cargo air carriers, the sup-
plemental (predominantly charter) industry, the commuter/air
taxi carriers, and the helicopter carriers.
Turning first to the combination, scheduled carriers of the type
existing in 1938, nineteen companies have been allowed to enter
the business on the U.S. mainland as what are now known as "re-
gional carriers," nine of which continue to operate." The smallest
of these carriers operated 21,600,000 revenue plane miles in 1974
and carried 758,900,000 revenue passenger miles that year? - -
making it (on the revenue passenger mile basis) nearly four times
larger than the largest of the original carriers in 1939." The largest
cumstances. Section 416(b) provides that the CAB, from time to time and to
the extent necessary, may (with certain limited exceptions) exempt any air carrier
or class of air carrier from the economic regulatory provisions of the statute or
any rule, regulation, term, condition or limitation prescribed by the CAB there-
under, if the agency finds that the enforcement of those provisions is or would be
"an undue burden on such air carrier or class of air carriers" by reason of the
limited extent of, or unusual circumstances affecting, its operations, and is not
in the public interest. While this provision cannot be used to undermine the basic
statutory scheme, the provision does give the agency an immense amount of dis-
cretion and flexibility to act expeditiously to meet changing circumstances. See,
e.g., Hughes Air Corp. v. CAB, 492 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Island Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 363 F.2d 120, 125 (9th Cir. 1966); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
235 F.2d 845, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
88 These carriers were originally created and known as "feeder" airlines. It was
then contemplated that, on sort of a "rural free delivery" basis, these airlines
would operate between smaller towns as yet incapable of wholly supporting their
own air service (hence these carriers were subsidized) and larger hubs, in order
to feed traffic to and from the longer distance operations of what then became
known as the "trunkline" air carriers. (The latter air carriers have themselves
greatly carried in their type of operation over the years. Some have always con-
centrated heavily on long-haul operations, and have progressively given up smaller
cities to other air carriers, whereas carriers such as Delta Air Lines, Inc. have
continued to serve small and medium-size towns, as well as operating over longer
distances between the major hubs.) The "feeder" air carriers rapidly grew in size
and soon became known as "regional" air carriers. Even this title is a misnomer
however, because, as will be explained in more detail below in the text, most
of these carriers are now far, far larger, and serve a much more vast area, than
did the original carriers for many years after their creation. For example, one of
the so-called "regional carriers," Allegheny Airlines, serves a system which spreads
from Boston and New York in the East to Memphis in the West and from
Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Montreal in the North, to Tennessee
and Virginia in the South. In the latest year for which statistics are available,
Allegheny transported 3,404,639,000 revenue passenger miles over its system.
This is more than the largest of the nation's air carriers (then American Airlines)
transported as late as 1954.
"9 The foregoing plane mile and revenue passenger mile statistics come from
CAB, AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS. This is the same source used for similar
statistics in the following text, except where noted otherwise.
4 0 Indeed, as early as 1946, following the growth stimulus of World War II
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of the so-called regional carriers served 3,404,639,000 revenue
passenger miles in 1974-2.6 times more than was carried by the
largest of the original carriers in 1946. In fact, the same regional
carrier's 1974 revenue passenger mile production was greater than
that of the largest of the original carriers as late as 1954." This is
indicative of the extraordinary growth of this whole new class of
entrant.
The class as a whole served 10,808,141,000 revenue passenger
miles during 1974, the latest year for which such data are avail-
able-over twenty-one times the number carried by all air carriers
in 1938, when the CAB was created, and more even than the 10.2
million revenue passenger miles carried by the entire class of orig-
inal carriers as recently as 1951.
But that is just the beginning. Arguably, merely by creating more
of the same (even though there have been thirty-seven new com-
pany entrants into the combination, scheduled carrier business,'
and forty-nine demises, indicating considerable freedom of entry
and exit), the CAB would somehow have defaulted in applying
the pro-competitive provisions of the statute. But the agency has
in no manner so limited itself.
In addition, as mentioned above, the agency has created four
whole new industries.' First, ten all-cargo "specialists" have been
allowed to operate, with eight of these subsequently being certifi-
cated, three of which remain in full active service." The largest
and the sudden availability of aircraft freed from that war, there were 24 U.S.
Mainland and territorial carriers. In addition, Pan American and Uraba, Medellin
& Central Airways, Inc. operated international routes and in that year "non-
scheduled" services were authorized by exemption from the certificate require-
ments, the beginning of the supplemental carrier industry. Investigation of Non-
scheduled Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 1049 (1946). The largest of the combination
carriers then operating flew 64,061,899 plane miles and 1,307,908,611 revenue
passenger miles, already a big jump over pre-war days. CAB, ANNUAL AIRLINE
STATISTICS (1946).
41 See note 38 supra.
41The total of 37 includes the 19 regional carrier entrants plus the U.S.
companies certificated to enter territorial and international service as combina-
tion carriers.
41 If the "regional" (formerly the "local service") carriers are considered a
separate industry, as many do consider them, the count is four: regionals; all-
cargo carriers; supplemental (charter) carriers; and the helicopter carriers.
44 These carriers were originally permitted to experiment with cargo service
without the necessity for a certificate, under the exemption power discussed in
note 38 supra. See also former CAB regulation 5 292.5, 12 Fed. Reg. 3079
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carried 795,778,000 revenue ton miles of property/mail shipments
in 1974-seventy times more than the 11,314,000 revenue ton
miles of such material carried by all of the air carriers existing in
1939; and more than three times the total property/mall carried
by all combination (passenger and cargo) scheduled carriers in
1950.
The latter is most significant. Air freight revenues are an impor-
tant contribution to the economic viability of operations by the
scheduled, combination air carriers, often spelling the difference
between less than adequate and a more reasonable return on invest-
ment. Yet this opportunity to realize satisfactory earnings has been
significantly diluted by the very condition which the deregulators
pretend has never existed-by the entry of new firms, and new
forms of endeavor, into the air transport business.
On an even more penetrating and competitive level, a second
new industry has been created-the supplemental air carriers,
which specialize in the increasingly popular charter services. Thirty-
three such companies have been certificated as new entrants into
the air transport business.' One of these ultimately metamorphosed
into a certificated combination carrier."' This, however, was its un-
doing-it subsequently had to merge into a pre-existing sched-
uled, combination carrier, else its routes would have ceased to
exist."
Eleven of these carriers remain, three of which are currently not
operating. The other eight constitute a potent and growing force in
U.S. air transportation. Together they serviced 10.9 billion rev-
enue passenger miles in 1974, the last calendar year for which such
data is available-more than the entire class of original carriers,
plus the entire group of regional carriers that were given new entry
(1947). Subsequently, the industry itself sought the stability and the improved
access to financing that certification provides (a course also pursued by the sup-
plemental carriers and, today, by some commuter carriers). A number of the
original all-cargo carriers have merged into the three survivors, so that their
routes continue to exist.
4 CAB, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1975); CAB, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS (1960).
'Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., which was certificated in the Service to
Puerto Rico Case, 26 C.A.B. 72, 140-44 (1957).
4'American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case, CAB Order No. 70-12-161 (Dec.
18, 1970).
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during and since World War II, carried on a combined basis as
late as 1950.'
As the price of fuel rapidly escalates, and as other costs inflate,
significantly increasing the cost of providing air transportation
services, charter air transportation is becoming more and more pop-
ular. The basic theory of charter air transportation is that it oper-
ates on a full-plane (but irregular) basis, thereby holding the per-
passenger cost (and fare) as low as possible. At the same time,
despite the recent recession, the amount of discretionary income
available to citizens of the free world has significantly increased in
the last couple of decades, and indications are that it will continue
to increase into the foreseeable future."
These two factors, in tandem, are placing considerable emphasis
on the desirability of charter air transportation for the mass move-
ment of vacation travelers. This accounts for the phenomenal
growth of the supplemental air carrier industry (their volume of
revenue passenger miles has increased from 1.5 billion in FY 1964"
to the 10.9 billion noted above for Calendar Year 1974)' and
should account for significant growth in the charter services of these
carriers as well as the charter services provided by the combination
scheduled carriers during the next few decades.
Clearly, then, creation of the supplemental carriers alone has
been another major form of entry and exit.
This is also true of the recently authorized one-stop inclusive
tour and special event charter concepts. These are extremely liberal
charter regulations,"' which have for the first time allowed major
segments of the public to use low cost charter services without hav-
ing to belong to pre-existing organizations.
The one-stop inclusive tour regulations now permit members of
the general public to use single-destination charter services with
41 CAB, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS (1973).
" See, e.g., DUN'S REVIEW, Jan. 1976, at 31.
50 CAB, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1974).
51 CAB, AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS (Dec. 1974). The data for the sup-
plementals includes their military traffic, which has dwindled in amount in recent
years. The fact that this overall volume has not absolutely declined as military
traffic decreased shows the great appeal of charter services for discretionary,
civilian travel (in 1975 the supplementals experienced some traffic decline, but
that was due more to the generally poor economic conditions impacting on all air
carriers than the loss of military traffic).
52 14 C.F.R. S 378(a) (1975).
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very few limitations. For example, an individual passenger, wheth-
er he belongs to the Masons, the Knights of Columbus, or is just
plain John Q. Public, can secure space on a charter operating sim-
ply between Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale, or between New York
and Las Vegas, by merely purchasing his ticket and paying for it
a short while in advance and agreeing to stay at destination for only
four days. This type of operation directly competes with the sched-
uled carriers' long-existing package vacations which have been in-
strumental in developing air traffic to and from areas such as Flor-
ida, especially during the off-season. These new services will largely
blur the distinction between charter and scheduled services, and
constitute a significant new competitive condition in the U.S. air
transportation industry.
These new types of charter operations, both the one-stop inclu-
sive tour and the special event charter," can be conducted by any
air carrier, both the existing scheduled carriers and the various
supplemental carriers. What is often overlooked is that a carrier
such as United Air Lines, which has a large fleet of grounded air-
craft standing by ready to enter into services of this type, can now
go to a market in which it is not certificated, such as the New York-
Miami market, and operate a large volume of one-stop inclusive
tour charter services year round. Nationwide, in all markets, these
services and the special events charters can now be operated by
any trunkline or local service carrier, whether or not it is certifi-
cated in the market involved, and by the supplemental carriers.
This whole new concept, which is just now unfolding, consti-
tutes yet another significant form of entry and exit freedom into and
from the U.S. air transportation business. Indeed, during the first
three months of the regulation's existence (September 26-Decem-
ber 26, 1975) 495 OTC prospectuses covering 14,000 flight oper-
ations and making available approximately 2.5 million seats," were
filed with the CAB. 5
'3 The special event charter is also available to members of the general public
and is not conditioned upon membership in a preexisting organization. This type
of charter is very similar to the one-stop inclusive tour charter, except that it is
specifically related to special events, such as the Super Bowl game or other traffic-
generating circumstances.
"Seats computed on basis of average of 180 per flight operation.
'These 2.5 million seats compare to the 2.7 million inbound and outbound
passengers on scheduled service at Atlanta, the nation's second busiest airport,
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These statistics concerning the regional carriers, the all-cargo
carriers, and the supplemental carriers alone" highlight a gross mis-
representation of the deregulatory proponents. With a semantical
sleight of hand, the "Analysis" which accompanied the Adminis-
tration's unveiling of the proposed Aviation Act of 1975, states:
No new carrier has ever been permitted to enter trunk line service
since the Board [CAB] was created in 1938."
The fact that thirty-seven new entrants have been certificated into
the combination, scheduled air carrier business (many now larger
than any so-called "trunk-line" in 1938), the entrance and con-
tinued existence of the all-cargo carriers, and the certification of
the highly competitive supplemental carriers, with the outstanding
growth and current market penetration which was detailed above,
all go wholly unheeded in this careful choice of the words "trunk-
line"-words not even found in the existing statute, and words cur-
rently used to describe an industry far different from that existing
in 1938 when that statute was first passed."
But the story of airline creation does not end there. By further
use of the extraordinary, flexible exemption power, the CAB has
allowed another whole class of carrier to flourish and grow and to
serve millions of passengers and shippers without even the neces-
during the last quarter of 1974, the latest comparable quarter available. While
some of the 2.5 million OTC seats will not be operated on the dates now planned,
other prospectuses will be filed during subsequent quarters covering the same and
other future periods.
'The other sub-industry, the helicopter carriers, remain a relatively small
part of the overall air transport industry.
57 See page 3 of the Administration's Analysis which accompanies the pro-
posed Aviation Act of 1975. [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATION'S ANALYSIS].
"8 The word "trunkline" seems to have been coined around 1944-46, when
the CAB found need to distinguish the original carriers from the new "feeder"
carriers then being certificated. See Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pick-Up
Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 1, 27 (1944); CAB, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 3
(1946). As discussed above, those "feeder" carriers are now "regional" carriers
and are larger than were the carriers providing "conventional trunk-line service"
when that term was used in the 1946 Annual CAB Report to distinguish them
from the new entrants. The smaller of the so-called "trunklines" have also been
known in times past as "regional" carriers as they passed through the same growth
stages that present regional carriers have been experiencing. See, e.g., New York-
Chicago Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 973, 978 (1955). But the whole industry and
all of its parts have grown since then. Hence, in the sense that the word "trunk-
line" was used in the 1940s and 1950s to describe the original carriers, it would
aptly describe the present regional carriers. There has been entry into the "trunk-
line" business and much of it.
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sity of certification. Originally known as "air taxis" a number of
these carriers have grown into regularly scheduled operations de-
nominated "commuter services,"" and one of the original group
has since been certificated as a full-fledged regional air carrier."4 In
Fiscal Year 1974, the remaining group of commuters carried 6.3
million passengers1 (in 1944 the entire air transport industry serv-
ed only about 4 million passengers)."' In addition, during 1974
there were 3,424 additional air carriers registered with the CAB as
air taxis."
The facts thus clearly belie the deregulators' charge that the
CAB has "severely restricted" the entry of new firms into the in-
dustry. There has been extensive entry and exit, and the process
continues."
(2) Existing Carriers Have Greatly Increased The Number of
Cities Served.
Equally misleading is the charge in the Administration's so-
called Fact Sheet that the CAB has "tightly controlled which cities
existing airlines are allowed to serve. '
Certainly the CAB has applied the provisions of the statute which
require it to certificate carriers before they may add new cities
to an interstate system. The agency cannot legitimately be criti-
cized for overseeing the development of the nation's air transport
systems in this Congressionally prescribed manner, for to have done
less would have left the Board open to a charge of dereliction of
statutory duty. While the statute is strongly pro-competitive, it does
5914 C.F.R. § 298 (1975).60 Air New England, certificated in the New England Service Investigation,
CAB Order No. 74-7-70 (July 17, 1974); CAB Order No. 74-10-101 (Oct. 18,
1974).
61 CAB, Am CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS (June 1974).
61 CAB, ANNUAL AIRLINE STATISTICS (1944).
CAB, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 11 (1974). The report shows a
total of 3,650 registered air taxis, from which the number shown for commuters
(226) has been subtracted to product the figure in the text.
" A recent U.S. Mainland certificated entrant is Air New England. See note
60 supra. Since 1970, Northeast Airlines, Mohawk Airlines, Trans Caribbean Air-
lines, and others have existed (mostly through merger, so most of the routes and
the competition remain). The exits were not forced by the CAB, they were dic-
tated by economic reality and the existing Federal Aviation Act was flexible
enough to permit same while preserving the routes and the competition.
15 ADMINISTRATION'S FACT SHEET, at _.
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contemplate a certificated system, with security of route authority
-a system which has been most instrumental in the development
and growth of the U.S. air transport system. This concept of "se-
curity of route" was specifically cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Civil Aeronautics Board v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., when the Court
stated:
It is clear from the statements of the supporters of the predecessor
of the Aviation Act-the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938-that
Congress was vitally concerned with what has been called "security
of route"-i.e., providing assurance to the carrier that its invest-
ment in operations would be protected insofar as reasonably pos-
sible (emphasis in original).66
At the same time, the concept of route security is also important to
the investment community. As Robert Hotz, the publisher of Avi-
ation Week and Space Technology, editorialized prior to the ac-
tual release of the Administration's proposed bill:
The foundation of this domestic airline system is the government-
granted and guaranteed certificate for routes to be operated for the
public convenience and necessity. This certificate is what enables
the airlines to finance their equipment purchases. The guts of the
deregulation proposals would remove this certificate and the routes
it guarantees and open all markets to anybody and everybody who
had an airplane and offered to transport passengers where the
largest profits loomed. This phase of deregulation would pull the fi-
nancial rug out from under the present airline system and quickly
reduce it to the status of a chaotic air taxi service that served nei-
ther public convenience nor necessity.
Among other things, the concept of deregulation would destroy
air service to about 60% of the cities now served by scheduled
airlines because the traffic is only marginally profitable. The free
airline market would naturally concentrate only on the high-den-
sity routes, leaving the rest of the country to depend on over-
clogged highways, under-scheduled railroads and the odd river boat.
Public convenience and necessity would become the second victim
of deregulation."
As long as the CAB gives proper weight to the pro-competitive
provisions of this statute, it is only proper that it also recognize
61 367 U.S. 316, 323 (1961).
67 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, April 28, 1975, at _. The pro-
posed Act would technically retain the certificate concept but would nevertheless
greatly enhance freedom of entry and exit.
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and apply this need to secure investment stability. Accordingly,
the deregulators must mean that the number of cities and markets
served by the carriers now certificated has not sufficiently increased
over the years. But in this respect, they strain reality.
Leaving aside the hundreds of daily charter services by the sup-
plemental carriers, the many cities and markets served by all-cargo
and commuter carriers, and the vast array of international points
added over the years to the routes of U.S. carriers certificated to
serve foreign points, the number of domestic cities and markets
alone added to the U.S. air transportation system has steadily and
phenomenally increased. Thus, in November of 1938, 183 cities
and 3,051 markets were served by U.S. air carriers. In 1946 the
numbers were already 273 cities and 11,930 city pairs. By 1974,
596 cities were served domestically, and 52,406 city pairs68-a
1618% increase in markets since 1938, and a 339% since 1946.
And these are just markets served-there are many more city-pair
combinations certificated, but between which no traffic currently
moves.
If by "existing airlines" the Administration means only the suc-
cessors of those carriers already existing in 1938, the statistics are
still impressively against their position. The following table shows
nearly a doubling in the number of cities served by just those car-
riers:
The foregoing statistics alone show the lack of substance to the
charge that the CAB has "tightly controlled" the cities which exist-
ing airlines are allowed to serve. But there are more fundamental
statistics. For example, while most operations by the industry in
1939, 1946, and even 1955 were "monopoly" in the sense that
there were yet few directly competing authorizations of equal dig-
nity," today the situation is vastly different, as demonstrated by
the following chart (based on mid-1974 authority as applied to
1973 traffic, the latest available when these computations were
made).
68 CAB, O&D TRAFFIC SURVEYS and predecessors thereto. Cities are actual
count, as are city pairs (market) for 1939 and 1946. City pairs for 1974 are
estimated on basis of sampling from the now multi-volume survey reports.
"' There were instances from the outset of a one or two-stop routing compet-
ing with a nonstop routing and the like, but before, during and immediately after
World War II there were few directly competing routes of equal parity, such as
directly paralleling nonstop routes.
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NUMBER OF CITIES SERVED'
BY ORIGINAL SIXTEEN CARRIERS
Carrier
American
Braniff
Chicago & Southern
Colonial
Continental
Delta
Eastern
Inland
Mid-Continent
National
Northeast
Northwest
Penn. Central
Trans World
United
Western
Total
19392
13
16
21
19
27
38
12
322
19
7
6
3
59
60 1970 1974
6 50 53
1 50 51
3 3 a
4 4 4
*1 27 42
'0 62 75
)6 88 93
6I 6 6
9 36 32
5 25
.0 39 44
7 7 7
'0 105 57
'1 90 90
2 36 37
'1 608 574
Cities receiving service through 2 airports, such as Washington
National and Dulles, are counted as one city. Multi-community
designations, such as New York/Newark, Los Angeles/Ontario
are counted as served.
2 Cities certificated.
Merged with Delta.
Merged with Eastern.
a Merged with Western.
Merged with Braniff.
Name changed to Capital Airlines and later merged with United.
Source: 1938--CAB Reports to Congress, Fiscal Year 1971 and
November 1939 Official Airline Guide
1960 and 1970: Handbook of Airline Statistics, 1961 and
1971
1974-CAB Form 41 Schedule T-3 (a)
COMPETITIVE POSTURE: SCHEDULED, DOMESTIC
AIR TRANSPORT BUSINESS
Of 1912 Markets With Over 12 Passengers A Day Each Way
779 have competitive nonstop authority
308 have nonstop and competitive one-stop authority
70 have competitive one-stop authority
1157 61% have competitive authority
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599 have monopoly nonstop authority
120 have monopoly one-stop authority
36 have no authority
755
O 530 Markets With Over 100 Daily Passengers
All have nonstop authority
98% have competitive authority
79% have competitive nonstop authority
Of 71 Markets With Over 500 Daily Passengers
Only 1 does not have competitive nonstop authority and it has
competitive one-stop authority
Of 863 Markets With Over 50 Daily Passengers
1968 Today
23 with no nonstop authority 8 with no nonstop authority
165 with no competitive 60 with no competitive
authority authority
11 with competitive authority 1 with competitive authority
-no nonstop -no nonstop
102 without nonstop service 17 without nonstop service
Source: CAB O&D Traffic Survey; CAB Granted Air Carrier
Certificates for Combination, Scheduled Service.
Analysis prepared by Boeing Aircraft Company.
Although the table does not reflect the fact, in many, many mar-
kets the competition is multiply authorized. For example, there are
three carriers certificated in the Northeast-California, Northeast-
Florida, Chicago-Atlanta-Florida and other markets; and up to five
major carriers in such corridors as Atlanta-Miami and New York-
Chicago.
In view of all of this, it is not surprising that over seventy-nine
percent of the nation's scheduled air passenger traffic" is compe-
titively served.71 Extensive, additional competition is provided by
70 Based on domestic scheduled carrier revenue passenger miles in 1972. CAB,
O&D TRAFFIC SURVEYS.
71 ADMINISTRATION'S ANALYSIS, at 3 states that the CAB has been erratic with
respect to entry by established firms into new markets, tending at times to permit
carriers to expand and at other times denying expansion. The implication is that
there is something evil here. But the certification cycles have simply followed the
nation's economic cycles. Thus, the initial major round of certification occurred
during and immediately after World War II in expectation of greatly expanded
demand for air transportation. A period of time ensued during which these certifi-
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cations were digested by the carriers and a second major round then followed in
the mid-1950s. See Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 829 (1958)
and St. Louis-Southeast Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 342 (1958), creating Midwest-
Southeast Florida competition; Service to Puerto Rico Case, 26 C.A.B. 72
(1957); Eastern Route Consolidation Case, 25 C.A.B. 215 (1957), creating new
competition between the Midwest and the East Coast, some three-carrier; New
York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956), establishing three-carrier competition in
the major East Coast markets; Denver Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 1178 (1955),
creating new and additional east-west routes from many cities between and in-
cluding Chicago and Los Angeles/San Francisco; New York-Chicago Service Case,
22 C.A.B. 973 (1955), establishing competitive and new routes in a broad area
bounded by New York, Pittsburgh and Chicago; Southwest-Northeast Service
Case, 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955), establishing two and three-carrier competition between
the Southeast and Southwest, on the one hand, and the Northeast, on the other
hand. The listed cases are only examples of those expanding competition in the
1950s. In addition to such area cases, many particularized awards were made to
the so-called "trunklines." The "local service" (now "regional") carriers were
being permanently certificated after a trial period and were being rapidly expanded.
More and more international competition was being created between U.S. carriers,
in addition to the U.S.-foreign flag carrier competition, and the supplemental
carriers were given extensive new authority (as to the latter see Large Irregular
Air Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 838 (1955)). The latter certifications were
mostly made during a period of national economic vitality and were followed by
a period of relative economic doldrums in the late 1950s. Again, certifications
were relatively few during the period of economic recovery and while the airlines
were implementing and adjusting to the route awards of the 1950s, most of which
where highly competitive in nature. By the mid-1960s, the airline industry was
caught up in the robust, burgeoning economic activity then enjoyed by the entire
nation. From 1965 until the early 1970s, the CAB created new route after new
route and competitive authorization on top of competitive authorization. See
Southern Teir Competitive Nonstop Investigation, CAB Order No. 69-7-135 (July
24, 1969), CAB Order No. 72-1-99 (Jan. 28, 1972), creating competition in
southern transcontinental markets just eight years after the first single-carrier
service was certificated; Dallas/Fort Worth-Phoenix Nonstop Case, 51 C.A.B.
578 (1969); Service to Albuquerque Case, CAB Order No. 69-7-136 (July 24,
1969), CAB Order No. 69-9-110 (Sept. 9, 1969); Memphis/Huntsville/Birming-
ham-Los Angeles Service Investigation, 51 C.A.B. 648 (1969); Gulf States-
Midwest Service Investigation, CAB Order No. 69-5-25 (May 7, 1969), CAB
Order No. 69-9-18 (Sept. 3, 1969), creating additional competition between many
cities in the Gulf States and Texas, on the one hand, and midwestern points, on
the other hand; Transpacific Route Investigation, 51 C.A.B. 161 (1969), estab-
lishing, inter alia, multiple carrier competition between the U.S. mainland and
Hawaii; Pacific Northwest-Southwest Case, 16 C.A.B. 652 (1967), Pacific North-
west-Southwest Case, 51 C.A.B. 698 (1969), establishing new and competitive
authorities between the named areas; North Carolina Points Investigation, CAB
Order No. 70-4-62 (April 13, 1970), CAB Order No. 70-6-80 (June 12, 1970),
establishing Midwest-North Carolina-Florida competition. As with the 1950s,
these are only examples of competitive awards in the 1960s. The regional carriers
especially were extensively expanded during this time, while many other awards
were also made to the so-called "trunklines." Many international routes were
awarded. Again, route activity slowed down during the early 1970s, as the na-
tional economy slipped into its most serious recession since World War II and
the airlines were coping with the extensive route expansion of the late 1960s. For
the CAB to have acted otherwise than in concert with these cyclical economic
conditions would have constituted an abdication of responsibility and would have
seriously weakened the airline industry which, in fact, despite the economic prob-
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the supplemental and commuter carriers (whose traffic is not in-
cluded in that producing the seventy-nine percent).
In sum, there is little in the law or in fact to support the admin-
istration on its charge that freedom of entry and exit, and airline
competition, are unduly restricted under the existing law or its im-
plementation and application by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
II. AIRLINE PRICING COMPETITION; AIRLINE MANAGEMENT
PRICING FREEDOM
The Administration's Fact Sheet states that "[b]ecause of eco-
nomic regulation" there is little price competition in the airline in-
dustry."' The proposed solution is what is commonly called a "zone
of reasonableness," which deregulators want to place, in one rigid
form according to a few current economic notions, into the statute
itself.
In its basics, a "zone of reasonableness" is a percentage spread
above and below some mid-point believed to constitute a "just and
lems faced by some carriers today, has rapidly grown, developed and flourished
under the CAB's implementation of the Federal Aviation Act, all to the benefit
of the traveling and shipping public, the U.S. Postal Service and the national
defense. Indeed, it can be argued that despite paying heed to the economic cycles
the CAB has over-certificated the industry because, following each round of
competitive authorizations, a number of the carriers previously existing have found
it necessary to give up the ghost and to merge with other, stronger carriers.
Among other carriers which have disappeared in this manner (although their
routes persist) are American Overseas, Colonial, Capital, Mohawk, Trans Carib-
bean and Northeast. Current criticism concerning the CAB's own cyclical response
to economic cyclical reality has largely centered upon the supposed belief that
the Board and its staff declared an unofficial "moratorium" on new route cases
during the early 1970s. Had a complete refusal to consider new applications
existed, it would have been contrary to the provisions of the statute. Even this,
however, would not establish a defect in the statute, but only improper CAB
implementation and administration of that statute.
"
2 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, a good case can be made
that the similarity of fares from one carrier to another simply results from the
facts (a) that airlines service must essentially be the same from carrier to carrier
because of the limited number of vehicles available for providing that service
and the limited number of ways in which those vehicles can be configured and
(b) that these essentially similar vehicles must be operated over a highly com-
petitive and paralleling route system. While there always has been, and should
always be, considerable differences from carrier to carrier in terms of quality of
service and experimentation with selective promotional and discounted fares,
under these circumstances any fare innovation or basic fare change by one carrier
will soon be met by most competitors. This fact, plus the unavoidable "sameness"
of the basic ingredient (air transportation of persons and property) despite the
competitive climate will always produce a similarity of fares regardless of the
statutory and regulatory climate.
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reasonable" level for the particular service involved, ' within which
carrier management would be free to adjust its standard fare levels,
without being subject to complaint from any source, or to the pres-
ently existing suspension powers discussed below, with respect to
unjustness or unreasonableness. 5
As with airline competition, however, the present law already
provides for this type of pricing freedom-but not in the rigid form
of casting particular zone parameters into the concrete of legisla-
tion. And, as explained below, over the years considerable freedom
73 The "justness and reasonableness" of a rate/fare primarily is concerned with
its relationship to the cost of providing the service (including a fair return on
the investment devoted thereto under honest, economical and efficient manage-
ment) as best that can be estimated. See Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation,
Fare Level Phase 7, CAB Order No. 71-4-59 (April 9, 1971), CAB Order No.
71-4-60 (April 9, 1971); Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B.
481, 493 (1951).
14 The "zone of reasonableness" concept is normally discussed in terms of
its application to the day coach (the predominant) fare. It is here the proponents
of the "zone" concept primarily see a need for greater carrier discretion and
flexibility than currently exists, which they would achieve by insulating day coach
fare changes within a zone or zones from complaint and suspension. Considerable
freedom has always existed, and continues to exist, with respect to discounted and
promotional fares (e.g., excursion fares). Such fares, as well as first class and
night coach fares, are usually stated in terms of a percentage relationship to the
day coach fare, with discounted, promotional and night coach fares constituting
some percentage reduction from the day coach fare (in return for which the pas-
senger must accept certain conditions on his travel) and with first class fares
being set some stated percentage above the day coach fare (in return for which
more commodious accommodations and more inflight amenities are provided)
These various relationships to the day coach fare would not necessarily be affected
by establishment of a day coach "zone of reasonableness," but could remain con-
stant, with such related fares changing up or down as the day coach fare is
changed within its zone. At least one carrier (Delta Air Lines) however, has
proposed separate "zones" for each standard fare (first class, day coach and night
coach). With or without a zone concept in practice, however, carriers are always
free to introduce new discount and promotional fares provided that they can be
shown to make some net contribution to profit and therefore not simply to con-
stitute predatory pricing. See the decisions in Phase 5 of the CAB's Domestic
Passenger Fare Investigation, CAB Order No. 72-12-18 (Dec. 5, 1972), CAB
Order No. 73-5-2 (May 1, 1973), CAB Order No. 73-8-55 (Aug. 10, 1973).
7- The "zone of reasonableness" concept is related only to the "just and reason-
ableness" of fares/rates, i.e., their relationship to the cost of providing the service.
Even if a tariff filing is insulated from complaint and/or suspension on the basis
of unjustness and unreasonableness," the tariff would always remain subject to
those procedures with respect to alleged discrimination and preferential pricing.
Furthermore, the normal "zone of reasonableness" concept would leave intact
the Board's basic power to investigate any rate or fare, either on its own motion
or in response to a petition therefor and to order a change in any rate or fare
found in such an investigation to the unlawful (Section 1002(b), (g)) although
the proposed Act would severely curtail this power.
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has actually been allowed, although full zone of reasonableness
freedom has not yet been established and recent CAB decisions
have introduced undesirable rigidity into the current passenger fare
structure.76 But the central point of this article remains-a good
statute should not be destroyed as a means of reversing what some
deem to be wrong decisions under it, any more than the Constitu-
tion should be scrapped because of Watergate; the better courses
are (a) watchful legislative review and supervision (sometimes
herein called "legislative oversight") and (b) judicial review.
Is the present law "good" in this respect? The answer has to be
"yes" because the present statute both provides for extensive pricing
freedom and flexibility and makes provision for establishment of
the very kind of true zone of reasonableness ostensibly sought by
the deregulators.
As a foundation, the Federal Aviation Act contemplates carrier
establishment of the fare level and its structure. The Board has
aptly summed up the statute in this respect as follows:
[T]he basic policy of the statute is that rates shall be initiated in
the first instance by the carriers, subject to suspension and investi-
gation by the Board if it is believed that such rates are outside the
zone of reasonableness. Congress intended to grant carrier man-
agement latitude to establish rates within this zone, and empowered
the Board to fix rates only if it found the carrier rates unlawful."
The "zone of reasonableness" to which reference is made in this
quotation is not the type of zone currently contemplated, within
which there would be freedom even from complaint and suspen-
sion. The concept discussed by the CAB in the quotation is rather
like that of prima facie pleading-if a tariff filing appears to be rea-
sonably related to costs (and not to be discriminatory or preferen-
tial) it usually will be allowed to take effect, whether or not a com-
plaint has been filed against it. This often is the result in CAB prac-
" This rigidity, discussed in more detail below, resulted from the Board's five-
year and recently concluded Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, CAB Docket
No. 21866 (filed April 1, 1970). The air freight rate level and structure remain
tinder investigation in the Domestic Air Freight Rate Investigation, CAB Docket
No. 22859 (filed April 15, 1975), which awaits decision by the agency.
'"Minimum Rates Applicable to Air Freight, 34 C.A.B. 263 (1961). While
the quotation is in terms of air freight rates, the same statutory principles govern
both rates and passenger fares.
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tice even if, in response to a petition or on its own motion, the rate
or fare is subjected to investigation.
Despite a belief by the CAB that a carrier-proposed rate or fare
is prima facie unlawful, the agency can prevent the new tariff from
taking effect (can "suspend" it) for only 180 days.8 If the CAB
does not complete an investigation of the rate/fare and find it to be
unlawful within that period of time, the carrier is free to place the
proposed new tariff in effect, although investigation thereof might
continue. Upon subsequent completion of the investigation, the
CAB can still order the rate/fare to be changed, but in the mean-
time the whole initiative lies with the carrier."' The Board has no
power to prescribe the rates or fares without such an investigation,
in which the public as well as the carrier or carriers involved are
heard.'
Clearly, then, under the present law the basic right and obliga-
tion for establishing rates and fares, and their level and structure,"'
lies with the carriers.
Furthermore, the present law specifically provides for the very
type of "zone of reasonableness" that the deregulators cite as an al-
leged benefit of the proposed Aviation Act of 1975. Thus, Section
1002 provides that after notice and hearing, if the Board finds that
existing rates and fares are unlawful (and the Board presumably
7" The initial suspension can only be for a period of 90 days, but the original
90-day period can be renewed for 90 additional days. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g)
(1970).
7' A good example of carrier freedom and initiative in this area is Delta Off-
Peak Coach Fares, 39 C.A.B. 377 (1963). In that case the Board suspended and
set for investigation a proposal by Delta to introduce low fare "off-peak" night
coach service between Dallas and San Francisco, in which Delta had then recently
been certificated. Such low cost fares had never been provided by the incumbent,
which promptly complained against Delta's proposal. The investigation had no-
where near been completed by the expiration of the 180-day period, whereupon
Delta put the tariff into effect. The tariff thereafter remained available to, and
was extensively used by, the traveling public for a period of nearly two years,
until the Board's ultimate decision in the investigation. The decision found the
tariff unlawful on grounds of technical discrimination. The particular tariff in-
volved was therefore withdrawn at that time, although night coach service still
remains available in the Dallas-San Francisco market.
"0Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
81 The words "fare structure" normally refer to the relationship among fares
for the different classes of standard fare service (first class, day coach and night
coach) and the discounted fare services and to the relationship between fares
by distance.
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could find that the absence of a zone made the existing rate or fare
structure unlawful):
[T]he Board shall determine and prescribe the lawful rate, fare,
or charge (or the maximum or minimum, or the maximum and
minimum thereof) thereafter to be demanded, charged, collected,
or received .... (emphasis added)."
The "minimum/maximum" provision patently authorizes establish-
ment of a zone or zones insulating tariffs within the zone(s) for
complaint or suspension on grounds of justness and reasonableness.
A number of carriers (Delta Air Lines, American Airlines and
Continental Air Lines), the Department of Transportation, the
Department of Justice, and others so argued in the Board's recently
completed Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation." The Board did
not question its own power to adopt such zones," but simply de-
clined to exercise the power in that Investigation for a variety of
reasons. By not prescribing definite parameters, the present statu-
tory provision allows changes as times and need change.
The proposed Aviation Act of 1975 would withdraw the flexibili-
ty inherent in this existing provision." It would prescribe one par-
ticular formula and legislatively require its application to all situa-
tions and at all times: Plus 10% (over rates/fares existing "one
year earlier"), minus 40% (from the rate/fare in effect on date of
enactment of the statute), with the latter percentage to be replaced
three years after enactment with a floor that would cover only so-
called "direct costs" at any particular time. The term "direct costs"
is defined to exclude all general and administrative expenses, de-
preciation, interest, amortization, capital expenses, route develop-
ment costs, "and other fixed costs or costs which do not vary im-
82 49 U.S.C. § 1382(d) (1970). The power to set the minimum and maximum,
and thus to prescribe a zone of reasonableness, is an alternative to the Board's
power to prescribe specific rates, fares or charges in domestic tranpsortation. A
proviso to Section 1003 states that with respect to overseas air transportation
(transportation between a point in the 50 states or the Disrict of Columbia, on
the one hand, and U.S. territories and possessions, on the other hand, or between
points in U.S. territories and possessions) the Board can only prescribe a just and
reasonable maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum rate, fare or
charge.
83 CAB Order No. 74-3-82 (March 18, 1974).
"Id. at 108-122.
The present provision can be exercised only after notice and hearing and a
finding of unlawfulness of existing rate/fares, and this particular aspect of the
provision perhaps could be liberalized.
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mediately and directly as a result of the service at issue."" A pro-
posal by any air carrier, large or small, strong or weak-and the
advantage would be with the strong carriers-could therefore cut
fares and/or rates drastically below full costs or providing the serv-
ice, and the CAB would be powerless to prevent the resulting de-
structive price war by use of its suspension power or even to de-
clare the tariff unlawful after investigation. Once its competition
had been eliminated, under the 10% -a-year rule87 the surviving car-
rier could steadily increase rates/fares without the checks formerly
provided by the eliminated competitors.8
The Administration's proposal has many defects: It would ob-
viously encourage predatory pricing;89 it would give stronger car-
riers virtually an unchecked tool to drive out competitors; it wauld
aid and abet the concentration of scheduled service between only
the larger cities;"' and as noted, it would introduce undesirable rigi-
dity by withdrawing much of the agency's present flexibility to fa-
shion zones to meet differing times and differing needs. But this
"Section 14 of the proposed Act.
'7 Under the proposed legislation, an increase of 10% or less could not be
suspended by the CAB. While the increase perhaps could still be investigated and
later found to be unlawful, the increase would be in effect for some time prior
thereto (the Act does not provide for reparations) and the effect, if any, on later
increase under the same 10% rule is not clear.
8" The deregulators contend that if even greater freedom of entry/exit is also
established, new companies would enter the airline business to replace those which
the larger carriers had driven from business. This contention is most naive. The
capital requirements and the large number of skills necessary to operate an airline
on any significant scale or in any major market could not readily be amassed by
would-be new entrants, even if the present licensing requirements were eliminated.
"9 Predatory pricing is usually considered to be below-cost pricing in order to
gain an unfair competitive advantage. As noted in preceding text, under the pro-
posed Aviation Act of 1975 the CAB would be prohibited from suspending or,
even after investigation, from finding unlawful, any fare (or air freight rate)
which covered "direct costs," a term so narrowly defined that it would cover little
other than salaries, fuel and in-flight amenities. Whatever the standard might be
in other industries, it would be a strange airline executive who did not consider
an operation which covered only salaries, fuel and in-flight amenities to be "below
cost." Any manager who attempted to operate an airline on such a basis would
soon be removed by his directors and stockholders. Yet this "loss leader" pricing
is encouraged by the proposed Aviation Act, and would be particularly appealing
to the larger, financially stronger carriers, who could use such a device to quickly
rid themselves of weaker competitors.
"8 The proposed freedom of entry and exit would inevitably result in service
by the larger carriers (not new entrants) being centered in the larger, more lucra-
tive markets. The zone in the proposed Act would provide the means for thinning
the ranks of carriers, thereby leaving fewer of the existing carriers concentrated
in only the major markets.
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flexibility is part of the remarkable, overall responsiveness and
adaptabililty of the Federal Aviation Act. The present law in these
respects is far preferable to the proposed Aviation Act of 1975.
But what has been the CAB's track record under the existing
law? Originally the record was quite good; more recently, as men-
tioned earlier, the record has deteriorated because the agency has
introduced more rigidity into the passenger fare structure than in-
tended by Congress.
For the first thirty years or so of its existence, until about 1970,
the CAB did not attempt to control passenger fares on any exten-
sive basis. Carriers were largely left free to introduce fares into, or
to change fares in, individual markets as their sales and business
judgment dictated, subject to the right of the public or other car-
riers to complain and request investigation. Major fare innova-
tions were studied,"' and a few general guiding principles were de-
veloped,9' but they did little to hamper carriers' pricing freedom.
Perhaps this was because, prior to the late 1960's, aviation tech-
nological advances resulted in a declining trend of unit costs in the
air transport business. Accordingly, there were relatively few fare
increases.' Most of the passenger fare activity concerned promo-
tional and discounted pricing (read "price competition"), in which
considerable latitude was allowed to the carriers, although indi-
vidual proposals were found to be unjust and unreasonable and a
number of discounted/promotional programs were found to be dis-
criminatory and therefore unlawful."
1' For example, when first introduced (in 1948), coach service was subject to
a series of Board pronouncements in policy statements and press releases in
which the Board encouraged the development of this form of price competition.
See American Airlines Off-Peak Coach Service, 25 C.A.B. 25, 34-36 (1958).
Similarly, significant expansions of the coach concept were investigated, including
off-peak (night coach) operations. See, e.g., Delta Off-Peak Coach Fares, 39
C.A.B. 377 (1963); American Airlines Off-Peak Coach Service, 28 C.A.B. 25
(1958). Other innovations were similarly studied in cases such as Airbus Tariffs
Investigation, 39 C.A.B. (1963) and Trans World Airlines, Siesta Sleeper-Seat
Service, 27 C.A.B. 788 (1958).
" See, e.g., General Passenger Fare Investigation, 32 C.A.B. 291 (1960);
Suspended Passenger-Fare Increase Case, 25 C.A.B. 511 (1957). Prior to the
1970s, most general principles used in judging the lawfulness of rates and fares
were developed on a case-by-case basis.
93 There were a few increases in the immediate post-war period; an increase in
1952 of $1 per ticket; approximately a 5% increase in 1960 and another 3% in
1962. These increases fell far short of the inflation rate over the same period of
time, so that in relative dollar terms, fares decreased.
4 See, e.g., Capital Group Student Fares, 26 C.A.B. 451 (1958); Capital
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In the field of air freight rates, during the pre-1970 period the
Board did use the language from Section 1002(d) to establish
minimum rate levels. This was necessary because the post-World
War II entry of new carriers into the air freight field under the ex-
emption noted in previous sections of this article had precipitated a
rate war between those carriers and the certificated, combination
carriers. In this situation, the Board not only found that the com-
petitive pressures then existing could drive rates to levels which
would undermine the financial strength of the new all-cargo indus-
try but also found that:
On the other hand, experimentation under the pressure of com-
petition with types of aircraft, character of service, route patterns,
rate structures, development of traffic potentials, and other phases
of operation is of greatest importance to the fullest development of
the air freight industry. The problem to be met is one of determin-
ing a balance in the regulatory action to be taken so as to provide
effective restraints to destructive rate competition, while leaving
the maximum freedom for the development of the operational and
service aspects of the industry. It shall be our purpose in this pro-
ceeding therefore to set forth certain of the more basic principles
in a program of sound rate making and to take such corrective
actions, in respect to the existing and proposed tariffs which gave
rise to this investigation, as appear necessary on the basis of the
record (emphasis added).'
In order to meet this problem, the Board established minimum
rates but did so only by limiting the possibilities for destructive
competition. In the areas of the greatest concentration of traffic
(smaller shipments over short and medium hauls), the minimum
was related to actual costs. But for larger shipments the minimum
was below existing cost levels, recognizing the cost savings inherent
in increasing weight and distance of shipment and leaving maxi-
mum freedom to construct rate structures with as much variety as
the carriers desired. " Various modifications to the minimum rate
order were made during the period 1948-1958 and, in 1961, the
order was revoked in its entirety, leaving the carriers complete free-
Family-Plan Case, 26 C.A.B. 8 (1957). The leading court case concerning promo-
tional and discounted fares came later, Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB,
383 F.2d 466, 482 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1967).
Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948).
Id. at 352-54.
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dom to price their air freight services, subject only to the normal
complaint, suspension, and investigation provisions of the sta-
tute.
97
While considerable freedom thus existed with respect to both
fares and rates prior to 1970, the post-1970 period has been quite
different, especially with respect to passenger fares. In many re-
spects this change reflected the end of the rapid technological de-
velopment from which the air transport industry had benefited
since its inception. As a consequence, the general cost inflationary
spiral, which had been affecting other segments of the economy
for some time, rapidly began impacting on the air transport indus-
try. This situation was exacerbated by the rapid escalation of fuel
prices commencing in 1974,"8 which was allowed to affect the air
transport industry more than most of the economy. These condi-
tions demanded fare increases starting in late 1969 which, of ne-
cessity, were approved in significant part by the Civil Aeronautics
Board until recently. These approvals, together with other actions
by the CAB discussed below, brought the agency into disfavor with
some, particularly the deregulators, even though an extensive thin-
ning of the ranks and weakening of service might have resulted had
the fare increases not been permitted. More recently, the political
uproar has restrained the CAB's freedom even to apply the existing
Congressional standards and its own criteria which it had developed
after notice and hearing.99
1 Minimum Rates Applicable to Airfreight, 34 C.A.B. 263 (1961).
98 From the outset of the "fuel crisis" in the fall of 1973 the federal authorities
who allocate fuel held the airlines to a consumption level no higher than that
the industry realized in 1972. To the best of the author's knowledge no other
industry was so tightly restricted. At first the airlines could not even get this
limited quantity. Then, when supplies finally started to increase, suppliers were
allowed to increase their prices to the airlines enormously. The average price per
gallon paid by Delta Air Lines, for example, has increased over 170% from 1973
to 1976. Although Delta's consumption of fuel has been decreased by 8.5% since
1973, Delta's fuel costs in 1976 will be 150% greater than they were in 1973.
Other airlines have had similar experiences. In 1974 alone the industry's fuel bill
increased by $1 billion, and the industry fuel cost is currently increasing at a
rate of $1.4 million per day. AIRLINEWS, Oct. 1975, at _.
"'See CAB Order No. 75-6-72 (June 13, 1975); CAB Order No. 75-8-99
(Aug. -, 1975); CAB Order No. 75-9-115 (Sept. 30, 1975) where, in acquie-
scence to the political critics who were second-guessing the agency to which
Congress had delegated the power to apply the Congressional standards, the
CAB, without notice or hearing, revised criteria which it had recently developed
only after careful review and study in the five year Domestic Passenger Fare In-
vestigation, supra note 76, and, still without notice or hearing, arbitrarily adopted
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The necessary fare increases which were permitted before 1975
might not have caused the furor they did if the agency had not also
rejected the pleas by the Department of Transportation, Depart-
ment of Justice, others now urging deregulation, and a number of
carriers as noted earlier, for establishment of a true "zone of reason-
ableness." This rejection came in the early part of 1974, in the
Board's final decision in its comprehensive, ten-part Domestic Pas-
senger Fare Investigation-its decision on fare structure."® The re-
jection seemed to reflect the slowdown in technological im-
provements of the airplane; at least a subconscious belief that with
the consequent end of the airlines' unit cost decline, the agency was
obligated to fasten a tight grip on the fare level and structure in
order to control the necessary fare increases. The asserted ground
for the rejection, and for related decisions to prescribe a precise
cost curve by mileage block to which fares must be tightly related,
was "that the zone proposals essentially constitute thinly-veiled ef-
forts to eliminate meaningful regulation of passenger fares" and that
they would nullify our laborious efforts to achieve a rational, equit-
able and cost-oriented fare structure.'
The cost curve initially prescribed (what this article will call the
"deviated curve") was skewed somewhat at long and short hauls
from the supposedly "true" curve,' ° in order to avoid the sudden
new criteria, all for the obvious purpose of foreclosing a fare increase which
would have been allowed under the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation criteria
and the statutory standards. This matter is under review in American Airlines v.
CAB, No. 75-2020 (D.C. Cir. - -,_).
100CAB Order No. 74-3-82 (March 18, 1974).
'0' Id. at 121. The latter contention necessarily proceeds on the fallacy that
the cost of providing each type of air transportation, for every varying length of
haul, can be precisely determined in the first place. But as the CAB has admitted:
Any attempt to allocate billions of dollars of costs to millions of
passengers moving in multitudinous lengths of haul is necessarily
imperfect and subject to a number of assumptions and judgments.
CAB Order No. 74-3-74, at 17 (March 18, 1974).
The latter being the case, the best that cost allocations and judgments can be
expected to produce is an approximation for any particular type of service at any
particular length of haul and, on this basis alone, the carriers should be allowed
some managerial discretion to vary particular fares within reasonable parameters
around "the" prescribed fare.
"2 The impreciseness of costing techniques militates against precision for
either the "true" or the deviated cost curve. For this reason, and because the area
for managerial discretion would be too narrow in any event, the difference be-
tween the two curves cannot reasonably be claimed as a "zone of reasonableness."
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large increases in short-haul fares which would have been required
by the so-called "true" curve."
Carriers were required to refile all of their day coach fares
(which, in turn, affected all first class, night coach and discounted
fares that bore percentage relationships to the day coach fares) in
order to adhere precisely to the deviated cost curve at all distances.
Since then carriers have been allowed to file changes in the level
and/or taper of day coach fares, but any changes in taper must
move the coach-fare curve closer to the supposedly true cost curve
at all distances. Even such permissible taper changes (clearly with-
in any conceivable zone of reasonableness), as well as overall level
changes, were left subject to the normal complaint and suspension
procedures."' The Board prescribed that any change in coach fares
in individual markets, or which strayed further from the "true"
cost curve than permitted by the deviated cost curve at any dis-
tance or distances, would be rejected.10
The CAB's motives in tying the industry hand and foot in this
manner were not entirely self-serving. The decision did strengthen
the agency's control of the industry and, to that extent, insured (if
101 The contention was that long-haul fares had been overpriced in relation to
"true cost" while short-haul fares had been underpriced. (Many members of the
industry strongly disputed this contention.) The cost curve adopted was supposed
to "correct" this alleged situation as much as marketing conditions would permit
at that time wtihout serious loss of short-haul traffic, with the remainder of the
"correction" to come sometime in the future. CAB Order No. 74-3-74, at 72-
82,173-76 (March 18, 1974).
104 As discussed above, true zone of reasonableness would insulate fare changes
within the zone from the complaint and suspension procedures.
105 These findings and conclusions are set forth at CAB Order No. 74-3-82,
at 175 (March 18, 1974). Pages 161-80 of that order discuss the Board's reason-
ing in arrogating to itself a power to reject tariffs not merely for errors of form,
as contemplated by Section 403(a) of the Federal Aviation Act, but because a
proposed fare does not comply as to level and structure with an order in a previ-
ous CAB investigation. Expansion of the rejection power in this manner in effect
repeals the entire statutory scheme whereby carriers are to initiate fare changes
which, if they meet the technical, formal requirements of the statute, can at the
most be suspended for a temporary period while charges of illegality, if any, are
properly investigated. See Section 1002 of the Federal Aviation Act. This course
of action by the agency has clearly contributed to the rigidity of its fare structure
decision and is highly controversial. The CAB's views of its rejection power have
been upheld in a limited factual situation where a carrier proposed to change a
fare immediately after the Board's decision in a comprehensive investigation, in
a cryptic and unhelpful decision, United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 518 F2d 256
(7th Cir 1975). The rejection power remains under review by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in another context in, Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. CAB, No. 74-1984 (D.C. Cir. - , _).
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it did not expand) the CAB's jurisdiction. But the agency's goal
was perhaps laudatory: to relate the fare structure as closely as pos-
sible to reasonable and allowable costs of providing the service in
the new era of unit cost increases, so that no passenger would
"subsidize" any other passenger unduly, and so that fares for a par-
ticular length of haul in one area of the country would not differ
markedly from fares for a similar length of journey in another sec-
tion of the nation.'
. These goals could have been accomplished as well, and prob-
ably better, without the severe rigidity which the decision introduc-
ed into the fare structure."' It is strongly felt by some, including
the author, that this CAB decision was a major cause of the pre-
sent deregulation efforts." But pique over rejection of one possible
course of action in favor of another, both allowed by the law, is
flimsy ground for destroying the benefits of, including the flexibility
embodied in, the present statute. The ability of the present law to
meet changing circumstances should be preserved, while attempts
alter the nature of its implementation and CAB policies should be
accomplished by legislative review and supervision 9 or, at the most,
10 This reasoning overlooks many pertinent considerations, including (a) the
fact that the nature of airline operations and the conditions which those operations
meet differ widely from area of the country and affect the costs of service from
market to market; and (b) the fact that payment by a long-haul passenger, for
example, of more than the theoretically allocated costs of providing long-haul
service does not necessarily "subsidize" the short-haul passenger who would not
fly at all if his fares had to cover the full costs of short-haul service, because the
long-haul passenger is also paying for the costs and value of a nationwide, inte-
grated air transportation system serving small as well as large markets, costs
which the short-haul passenger also pays whenever he journeys beyond a local
short-haul market.
107 Similar rigidities have not yet been introduced into the air freight rate
structure but, as noted above, that structure, and its level, remain under con-
sideration in the CAB's comprehensive Domestic Air Freight Rate Investigation,
CAB Docket No. 22859 (filed April 15, 1975).
100 There were other causes for the deregulation effort as well, particularly
temporary approval by the CAB of so-called capacity control agreements, which
limited competition between certain carriers in a limited number of markets, a
decision since reversed (discussed infra), and an alleged, but unannounced "mora-
torium" on new route cases during the early 1970s which has now also been ended
(a large number of new route proceedings are currently being instituted, or are
in process).
109 The value of such legislative "oversight" has recently been proven. The
end of the alleged route moratorium; the issuance of far more liberalized charter
regulations than had earlier been proposed; and, as noted above in the text, a
number of recent fare decisions, including those which have rejected costs actually
incurred by the industry in a somewhat contrived effort to prevent the carriers
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by some experimental direction to the CAB to use its existing
"zone of reasonableness" power more fully."'
III. ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS
The Administration's Fact Sheet accompanying the release of
the Aviation Act of 1975 explains that another of the Act's major
goals is elimination of the CAB's power to approve, and thereby
to grant immunity from the anti-trust laws for, intercarrier agree-
ments which dampen competition by setting capacity levels ("capa-
city control agreements"), pooling revenues, and the like.11'
This goal, of course, is highly laudatory.1 ' But the proposed leg-
islative change is unnecessary.
The present law provides that all agreements among air carriers
must be filed with the CAB, and that the Board must approve or
disapprove such agreements:
The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agree-
ment, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be
adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this chapter, and
shall by order approve any such contract or agreement, or any
modification or cancellation thereof, that it does not find to be ad-
verse to the public interest, or in violation of this chapter. . .."I
The reference in this section to the public interest invokes the six
from passing fuel and other cost increases through to the traveling and shipping
public, can all be ascribed in varying measure to recent Congressional Hearings.
110As noted in note 85 supra, the existing power can be exercised only after
notice and hearing. It might be desirable to ease this requirement with respect
to establishment and modification of reasonable pricing freedom zones.
' The only agreement of this nature ever approved for U.S. carriers, at least
in domestic transportation, is the capacity control type of agreement, for which
approval subsequently has been withdrawn. The author is aware of no agreements
for pooling revenues or service of the type used in many intra-European markets,
that has been approved by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board. (The so-called
"Mutual Aid Pack," whereby one carrier pays to another carrier member of the
agreement a portion of added profits which the former has realized because of a
strike against the latter, is not the normal type of service/revenue pooling agree-
ment. Conceivably, however, it could be caught up in the proposed Aviation Act
of 1975.)
112 Many carriers, including particularly Delta Air Lines, Inc., Braniff Airway,
Inc., and Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., have consistently and strongly opposed
capacity control agreements and have never entered into such agreements them-
selves. See the CAB's decision in its Capacity Reduction Agreements Case, CAB
Order No. 74-7-98 (July 21, 1975) and the Initial Decision of Judge Seaver in-
corporated therein.
11249 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1970).
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standards laid down in Section 102 and previously discussed in this
article, including the mandate that the Board shall foster "compe-
tition to the extent necessary" to insure a national air transporta-
tion system which will meet national needs and goals.
Section 414 of the Act provides:
Any person affected by any order made under section ... [412]
of this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of
the "antitrust laws," as designated in section 12 of Title 15, and of
all other restraints or prohibitions made by, or imposed under,
authority of law, insofar as may be necessary to enable such per-
son to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such
order. 4
The Administration would change these provisions in three ways.
First, the proposed Act would require the CAB to notify both the
Secretary of Transportation and the Attorney General of all agree-
ments filed with the Board and, if requested by either, to hold a
hearing." ' But such a cumbersome procedure is wholly unneces-
sary. The Department of Transportation and the Department of
Justice have the same access to the CAB's public records that any
other interested person has, and they have full freedom to com-
ment on filed agreements, to seek particular action by the CAB,
and to request hearings in individual cases when they deem same to
be necessary. Both Departments have regularly participated in
CAB rate, fare, agreement, and other cases for years, and are fully
conversant with CAB procedures.
Furthermore, this aspect of the Aviation Act, together with the
proposal to apply classical antitrust principles.1 . can most logical-
ly be explained as an attempt by the Departments of Justice and
Transportation (both of which have had a large hand in fashioning
the proposed Aviation Act of 1975) to build up their powers at the
expense of an independent agency-another example of the juris-
diction war between the Executive and the Congress which is con-
tinually waged.' 7 Furthermore, the proposed procedure would re-
11449 U.S.C. S 1384 (1970).
115 ADMINISTRATION'S ANALYSIS, at 15.
"IOSee text accompanying notes 119 and 122 infra.
117 This explanation is corroborated by another proposal which the Adminis-
tration has made to modify existing legislation, the so-called Competitive Im-
provements Act of 1975 (S. 2028, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)). This legislation
would also give the Department of Justice (and the FTC) broad powers to re-
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suit in a situation in which, whenever the Administration disliked
a particular agency decision concerning intercarrier agreements, or
took a dislike to a previously approved agreement, it could force
hearings, and then rehearing after rehearing, until the executive
will was forced upon an agency which was created as an arm of
Congress.
Secondly, the proposed Act would subject intercarrier agree-
ments, even necessary intercarrier arrangements,"8 to a two-fold
test:
First, the agreement must meet a serious transportation need. Sec-
ond, other reasonable, less anti-competitive alternatives must not
be available."'
The first part of this test has been applied for years, and the sec-
ond part would be unduly restrictive and inimical to the public
interest in a sound air transportation system.
As long ago as 1952, in its Local Cartage Agreement Case".. the
quire the CAB to hold hearings concerning any matter deemed to be inconsistent
with the antitrust laws and would make the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission mandatory advisors to the CAB (and a raft of other agencies
over which the Executive seeks new power, including the CAB, FCC, FPC, ICC,
SEC, Maritime Commission and Agriculture) on procedures, legislative proposals
and other matters. In addition the proposed Act would repeal the last proviso of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)). That provision, among
other things, permits regulated companies, with approval by specified agencies
(see foregoing list), to acquire the whole or part of the stock or other capital
share, or the assets of another corporation engaged in a line of commerce, the
effect of such acquisition being to lessen substantially competition and create a
monopoly. Repeal of Section 7 at best would create confusion with the existing
Federal Aviation Act. If the latter were also amended as proposed, an enormous
shift of power from the CAB to the DOJ and FTC would result. In the process,
the nation's air transportation system would be fashioned not by "public interest"
standards but by classical antitrust economic principles.
" No one, including the Administration, has suggested a prohibition on those
many agreements which are necessary to operation of an integrated common
carrier air transportation system conducted by separate free enterprise companies,
such as uniform baggage and ticketing agreements, interline agreements covering
the handling of air freight and its pickup and delivery, agreements establishing
uniform communications systems for airline operation, the Airline Clearing House
for the handling of intercarrier financial transactions resulting from sales by one
line of tickets for transportation over another, and the like. But the Administra-
tion's proposed legislative changes would even subject these necessary agreements
to the two-fold tests discussed in the text.
lil ADMINISTRATION'S ANALYSIS, at 16.
10 15 C.A.B. 850 (1952).
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CAB ruled that the appropriate standard under Section 412 is
that:
Where an agreement has among its significant aspects elements
which are plainly repugnant to established antitrust principles, ap-
proval should not be granted unless there is a clear showing that
the agreement is required by a serious transportation need, or in
order to secure important public benefits.1"'
The Administration, through its own Department of Justice, has
recently attempted to persuade the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit that the second part of the
test which it now proposes should also be required. In rejecting the
proposal, the court explained:
There is no dispute that the Board in considering whether an
agreement is in the public interest must consider the agreement's
effects on competition. The Federal Aviation Act sets out compe-
tition as one of six factors to be considered by the Board in mak-
ing a public interest determination. This court has explicitly stated
on prior occasions that the Board must consider the anticompe-
titive implications of agreements submitted for approval under
section 412. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized in
analogous circumstances, even absent a specific statutory statement,
that an evaluation of the "public interest" includes a consideration
of anticompetitive effects.
. . . [In recent cases involving international air fare agreements
approved under Section 412 this court indicated] its view that
competition was but one factor to be considered in reaching the
public interest balance. For example, in National Air Carrier As-
soc. v. CAB (NACA I) the court said:
In short, the essential question, from an antitrust standpoint,
is whether the existence of a market structure conducive to max-
imum feasible competition will be imperiled by approval of the
agreement."Furtherance of the economic policy implications
of the agency's particular statutory charter may indeed compel
overriding of antitrust principles," [Cities of Statesville v. AEC,
No. 21,706 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 5, 1969) (en banc) slip op. at 45;
Judge Leventhal, concurring], but first the proper antitrust
questions must be asked and answered. Thus it is not really
responsive to an antitrust claim, except perhaps as a counter-
balance to the projected anticompetitive effects, so say that an
agreement will provide the public with lower fares, if there is a
risk that these lower fares are merely a step toward an ultimate
121 Id. at 853.
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increase in concentration. Price cutting, after all, is a time-hon-
ored tool of the aspiring monopolist.
* * *g
Turning to the Federal Aviation Act itself, it should be noted
that competition is merely one of six or more factors to be con-
sidered by the Board in determining the public interest. Conceiv-
ably, in any given case, a less anticompetitive means of achieving
the same result would be possible, but it might be uneconomical,
less safe, or discourage development of an air transportation sys-
tem properly adapted to America's future needs (to name three
other considerations set out in section 102). In that event, the
statute would appear to contemplate that the factor of competition
could be outweighed by one or more of the other factors. Even if
the value of competition is given a preferred status relative to
other aspects of the public interest, such a preferred status does
not lead one inexorably to the Government's "impossibility"
standard. In fact, the Local Cartage standard itself appears to
give competition a preferred status in the public interest balance."'
These agency and court decisions, of course, were construing and
applying the present Federal Aviation Act. But the balancing of all
public interest factors, and not merely a narrow, economic view of
antitrust law as applicable to industries less directly affecting the
public interest than does the common carrier air transport industry,
would clearly seem to remain the soundest approach for the future,
and the one most capable of resolving all conflicting national inter-
ests during periods of differing factual situations.
Thirdly, the proposed Act would statutorily prescribe specified
types of intercarrier agreements. Such a fiat, inflexible prohibition
is also undesirable, and unnecessary in view of the Local Cartage
test. While many, including a large segment of the airline industry,
have consistently and vigorously opposed the capacity control type
of agreement endorsed by a few carriers, this has been done in
the context of the existing Local Cartage test and its balancing of
competitive with other public interest factors. And application of
the Local Cartage test alone has resulted in a firm CAB decision
that, under existing conditions, capacity control agreements are
contrary to the public interest."
12 United States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11 Capacity Reduction Agreements Case, CAB Order No. 75-7-98 (July 21,
1975). The overall history of the capacity reduction agreement concept is a good
example not only of the flexibility of the existing Federal Aviation Act, but of
the fact that under the existing law such matters can be attacked and defended
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Rather than attempt to foresee the future and proscribe particu-
lar types of agreements, the flexible and broad Local Cartage test
should be left unmolested. There is no practical, legal, or theoreti-
cal need for a change in this aspect of the present law.
Procedural Reform
Although not strictly a matter of deregulation, the Aviation Act
of 1975 also addresses procedural form in limited respects, par-
ticularly expedition of the licensing process."
correctly, with opportunity for all to be heard before the agency and in the
federal courts. While many members of the air transport industry, as well as
other interested persons, opposed the capacity reduction agreement concept, a
number of carriers and some other interests, initially at least, were in favor of
such agreements. The first agreement filed by the proponents was disapproved by
the CAB, as having been developed from unauthorized discussions between the
carriers concerning anti-competitive subject matter. See CAB Order No. 70-11-35(Nov. -, 1970). Thereafter, some of the early agreements were approved and
subsequently extended without hearing (the present Federal Aviation Act does
not require a hearing concerning inter-carrier agreements, although one can be
held if the Board deems it necessary to development of all pertinent facts). See,
e.g., CAB Order No. 71-8-91 (Aug. 19, 1971); CAB Order No. 72-6-70 (June 16,
1972), as were a few fuel-related capacity reduction agreements which were
executed shortly after the onset of the fuel shortage in late 1973 and early 1974.
See, e.g., CAB Order No. 73-10-110 (Oct. 31, 1973); CAB Order No. 74-2-5
(Feb. 1, 1974). Prior to the onset of fuel-related capacity reduction agreements,
due in large measure to continuing objection by protesting carriers (Delta, Braniff,
and Northwest in particular), the Board set the entire subject of capacity agree-
ments down for thorough, litigated exploration of all policy, legal and factual
matters in the Capacity Reduction Agreements Case. During the pendency of the
administrative case, the Department of Justice, which had participated actively
before the CAB throughout the history of the capacity reduction agreement con-
cept, appealed one of the CAB's orders extending approval of one of the agree-
ments, in order to test the standards applied by the Board in continuing its
approval of the agreements without hearing. United States v. CAB, supra note
122. Before argument on the merits before the court the Administrative Law
Judge who heard the CAB's Capacity Reduction Agreements Case issued his
Initial Decision, disapproving the entire concept of capacity reduction agreements.
As noted in earlier text, the court's subsequent decision, citing the agency's
Administrative Law Judge's Initial Decision, upheld CAB interpretation of the
pertinent statutory sections as requiring only the Local Cartage test and not the
more severe test proposed by the Department of Justice. But the court .held that
the agency had not made a "principled choice of alternatives based upon evidence,"
when it continued to extend capacity control agreements without hearing. Shortly
thereafter the CAB issued its decision in the Capacity Reduction Agreements Case,
declaring the agreements contrary to public policy under the evidentiary facts
presented. The procedures which were followed were in full accord with existing
statutory law and with cardinal principles of due process and checks and balances
developed over the entire history of this nation. Anything more precipitous, or a
legislative change which would allow less flexibility or compromise the Local
Cartage test, would be contrary to the public interest.
124 Essentially, this proposed change is directed at the alleged "moratorium"
which the CAB was supposed to have enforced by not hearing new route cases
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Procedural reform is a most worthy goal, provided that it looks
at all aspects of the subject."n But this matter is being addressed
much more comprehensively on a number of other fronts.
For example, the CAB has appointed an Advisory Committee,
which, acting under the Federal Advisory Committee Act,' has
recently completed a six month examination of all aspects of CAB
procedures. A comprehensive report has been made available to
the public.' It proposes a large number of procedural reforms
designed to expedite and otherwise improve the CAB's procedures.
Similarly, in response to twelve resolutions adopted in August
1970 by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
a Special Committee on Revision of the Administrative Procedure
Act of the Administrative Law Section of the Association has
drafted legislation covering five broad subjects related to admin-
istrative procedures: changes in the type of hearing required; de-
velopment of uniform rules and powers among agencies; ex parte
communication prohibitions and internal agency separation of
functions; delegation of decision making to Administrative Law
Judges; and extra-agency matters. These proposed changes have
been embodied in draft legislation, which has been introduced in
the Senate by Senators Kennedy and Mathias, the Chairman and
a minority member of the Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
In addition, the American Bar Association has recently de-
voted considerable attention to the "Government in the Sunshine"
during the early part of the 1970s, following the economic downturn during the
early part of the decade. See ADMINISTRATION'S ANALYSIS, at 5. Had there been
a complete moratorium, it clearly would have been wrong. But even if that had
been so, far-reaching legislative change should not be based upon an attempt
to overturn individual agency action or inaction; other means, especially Congres-
sional supervision, are available for that purpose.
'2 It has been popular for years to blame the hearing process for administra-
tive delay, but an, objective analysis of available data indicates that, at least at
the CAB, the delay more often occurs at the level of agency review following the
hearing and issurance of the Initial Decision, than it does at the earlier stages.
See the Statement of Certain Members which forms a part of the recent report of
the CAB's Advisory Committee on Procedural Reform, single copies of which
may be obtained by writing Publications Services Section, Civil Aeronautics Board,
Washington, D.C. 20428. Another aspect often not given sufficient consideration
is the need for more "sunshine" in the administrative process.
5 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (Supp. 1975).
... See note 125 supra for address.
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legislative concept.' 8 More "sunshine" on the inner workings of the
Civil Aeronautics Board (and all federal administrative agencies
which must, to a large extent, rely on their "faceless staffs") would
undoubtedly work wonders with respect not only to substance and
openness, but also expedition.
It is submitted that these more comprehensive approaches are
preferable to the piece-meal approach of the Aviation Act of 1975,
which was conceived in reaction to one specific, unliked example of
agency reluctance to move during periods of economic adversity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The deregulators in general, and the proposed Aviation Act of
1975 in particular, claim goals other than those mentioned in this
essay which, because of space limitations, cannot be discussed.
Similarly, the proposed Act does not cover subjects which, in the
author's view, need more attention than those which are ad-
dressed.' But it seems abundantly clear that, based on the fore-
going considerations, there is simply no need for the drastic legis-
lative surgery proposed in order to achieve the major goals of the
deregulators-more competition, more pricing flexibility (and a
general restraint on fare/rate increases), tight control of anti-com-
petitive inter-carrier agreements, and procedural reform.
If the legislation is not needed to accomplish these goals, the
128 Extensive work in this area has been done by the ABA's Special Committee
on Open Meetings, chaired by Frank M. Wozencraft, Esq. Its work has resulted
in the adoption of a comprehensive resolution by the ABA evaluating and react-
ing to various proposals for "Government in the Sunshine" legislation. The special
committee has now been dissolved at its own request, and it is likely that con-
tinued efforts concerning this matter will be directed by the ABA's Administra-
tion Law Section. The resolution is set forth at 29 ABA AD. L. SEC., AD. L. REV.
iv-vi (1975).
129 For example, the American Bar Association has recommended legislation
which would limit the power of the President in international route and rate
matters, essentially confining his role to problems involving the national defense
and foreign relations, while removing economic and domestic political considera-
tions from the President's decision making process and assuring availability of
judicial review (resolution adopted by the ABA at its 1974 Honolulu meeting,
upon recommendation of its Administrative Law Section). Congressional action
on this ABA proposal would remove politics from international airline regulation
and leave all economic questions in the hands of the CAB. This, it is submitted,
would be entirely proper. In particular, the Executive should not play a role in
carrier selection for a route which has been found to be required by the public
convenience and necessity. Also see the recent report of the CAB Advisory Com-
mittee, supra note 125 concerning this general subject.
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question as to why it is being pushed so urgently at this particular
juncture rather clearly answers itself-the concept was conceived
in displeasure over a few, recent, particularized agency decisions
or inactions (mostly since reversed), and is being nurtured in the
caldron of election year politics."
These, it is once again submitted, are insufficient bases for mu-
tilating a law which has served the nation so well and for so long.
Whether one agrees with the original reasons for enactment of the
Federal Aviation Act and its predecessor, or the continued vitality
of those reasons, and whether one agrees with all aspects of its exe-
cution, it would be well to keep constantly in mind some recent
words by a respected colleague, "The more one attempts to preclude,
circumvent or solve a problem, the more one sows the seeds of
future problems."''3' The present Federal Aviation Act and its ad-
ministration can hardly be classified as a "problem," when they
have produced the world's foremost, lowest priced air transporta-
tion system. It is relatively easy, however, to see how tinkering
with this well-conceived machinery may sow the seeds of many
future problems, most notably the destruction of that system.'
130 There is little doubt but what the drive to force changes in CAB policy
and procedure also reflects the general post-Watergate inquisition which, however
productive in other areas, is of little value in judging the continued substantive
soundness of the Federal Aviation Act.
131 Quoted from a studied suggestion by Marion Edwyn Harrison, Esq., Last
Retiring Chairman of the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar
Association, that perhaps better Congressional articulation of objectives and agency
responsibilities is needed as much or more than deregulation. Chairman's Message,
27 ABA AD. L. SEC., AD. L. REV. - (1975).
'32 Mr. Harrison also points out that if a deregulatory proposal should not
work out, the proponents, like T. S. Eliot's nimble cat, Macavity, will "not be
there" when reckoning time comes. Mr. Harrison correctly notes that "[S]ome of
us individually and the aggregate of society are Macavity." But few individuals,
and (except in the historian's eye) certainly not society, will take the blame for
dismantling the present air transportation system.
1975]

